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A. Introduction 
The state appeals from the district court's granting Tyler's suppression motion, 
arguing that the court erred in its legal determination that patting down an exposed 
breast pocket was outside the scope of a Terry1 search, where that pocket was not on 
the outermost layer of clothing. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision 
on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court's 
findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the 
application of constitutional principles to those facts. State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302, 
160 P.3d 739,741 (2007). 
C. Officer Arredondo's Limited Terry Search Did Not Exceed Tyler's Consent 
As found by the district court and uncontested at the suppression hearing, Tyler 
consented to a search of his person, limiting the scope of his consent to that of a Terry 
search. (Tr., p.13, L.24 - p.14, L.6; p.37, Ls.3-6; p.53, Ls.9-11; see also State's Ex. 1.) 
The only question for this Court is whether Officer Arredondo's pat-down of the outside 
of the exposed right breast pocket on Tyler's flannel shirt is within the scope of a Terry 
search. Application the principles in Terry its progeny to specific 
1 (1968). 
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facts of this case presented at the suppression hearing shows that Officer Arredondo's 
pat-down fell within the permissible scope of a Terry search. 
The district court held, and Tyler argues on appeal, that as a matter of law Terry 
searches are categorically limited to pat-down searches of the outermost layer of 
clothing. (Respondent's brief, pp.1 0-20; see also Tr., p.51, L.17 - p.53, L.9.) That is an 
incorrect statement of the law. It is beyond question that a pat-down of the outermost 
layer of clothing is within the scope of a Terry search. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 29-30. 
However, that is not the only search that is permissible under Terry. 
The United States Supreme Court explained in Terry that the "limitations 
[applicable to Terry searches] will have to be developed in the concrete factual 
circumstances of individual cases." Terry, 392 U.S. at 29. Following that instruction, 
state and federal courts have found in cases where specific facts have given rise to 
reasonable suspicion that a suspect may be armed, searches that went beyond patting 
down the outermost layer of clothing were permissible under Terry. See,~, Adams v. 
Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148 (1972) (reaching into a suspect's clothing, such as his belt, 
permissible under Terry); Stanley v. United States, 6 A.3d 270, 276-77 (D.C. 2010) 
(shaking a defendant's belt permissible under Terry); United States v. Baker, 78 F.3d 
135, 138 (4th Cir. 1996) (directing a defendant to lift his shirt before conducting a 
preliminary pat-down permissible under Terry); North Carolina v. Smith, 562 S.E.2d 899 
(N.C. App. 2002) (lifting defendant's shirt to expose a possible weapon permissible 
under Terry); United States v. Hill, 545 F.2d 1191, 1193 (9th Cir. 1976) (same); U.S. v. 
Edmonds, 948 F.Supp. 562, 566 (E.DVa. 1996) (same), affirmed, 149 F.3d 1171 (4th 
Cir. 1998); United States v. Thompson, 597 F.2d 187, 191 (9th Cir. 1979) (reaching into 
2 
for a 
tried reach into his own 
718 1181, 1187 .D.N.Y. 1989) 
jacket to expose a bulge under defendant's sweater permissible under 
safety), affirmed, 927 F.2d 593 (2nd Cir. 1991). 
for 
In creating the warrant exception of a protective weapons search in Terry, 
only limitation the United States Supreme Court placed on the scope of that search was 
that it "be limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might 
be used to harm the officer or others nearby." Terry, 392 U.S. at 25-26. The only 
question for reviewing courts is the objective one: "Would the facts available to the 
officer at the moment of the seizure or search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in 
the belief' that the action taken was appropriate?" Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22 (citing 
Carro!1 v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96-97 (1964)). 
The district court erred by taking a mechanistic approach (did the officer limit his pat-
down to the outermost layer of clothing?) instead of applying this rule of reasonableness 
(could Tyler have reasonably accessed in his shirt's exposed breast pocket a hidden 
instrument with which to assault the officer?). Applying the principles articulated by the 
Supreme Court in Terry, it is apparent that merely patting down an exposed shirt 
pocket, where the companion pocket held a hidden instrument that could be used to 
assault the police officer, is reasonable and within the scope of a Terry search. The 
district court's ruling to the contrary was erroneous and should be reversed and this 
case remanded for further proceedings. 
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Citing Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (2009), Tyler argues that Terry searches 
only permit pat-downs of the outermost layer of clothing. (Respondent's pp.1 
13.) That is not the holding of Johnson. Rather, in Johnson, the United States 
Supreme Court held that "officers who conduct 'routine traffic stops' may 'perform a 
"patdown" of a driver and any passengers upon reasonable suspicion that they may be 
armed and dangerous.'" kL at 332 (citing Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117-18 
(1998) (see also discussion at 330-32). Contrary to Tyler's argument, Johnson does 
not restrict the scope of Terry searches beyond that discussed above.2 
The only case cited by Tyler which specifically discusses the scope and 
limitations of a Terry search is Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993), where the 
United States Supreme Court announced the plain feel doctrine. Under the plain feel 
doctrine, when an officer, patting down the outside of a pocket, "feels an object whose 
contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent," the officer may seize that 
item. kL at 375-76. The plain feel doctrine, however, does not permit an officer to 
manipulate a pocket's contents from the outside of the clothing in order to get a better 
feel for what the item is. kL at 378. Doing so impermissibly extends a limited Terry 
search for weapons into a limitless search for evidence, which is not necessary for 
officer protection and is therefore beyond the scope of a Terry search. kL Though not 
2 This is true of most of the cases cited by Tyler in his Respondent's brief. See,~, 
State v. Henage 143 Idaho 655, 661-62, 152 P.3d 16, 22-23 (2009) (holding that an 
officer must have reasonable suspicion that a suspect is both armed and dangerous to 
justify a Terry search); In re Doe, 145 Idaho 980, 983-84, 188 P.3d 922, 925-26 (Ct. 
App. 2008) (acknowledging that specific circumstances, like an arrest at night and 
suspects dressed all in black, combined with specific crimes, like burglary, increase the 
likelihood that a suspect will be armed and dangerous); State v. Johnson, 137 Idaho 
656, 661-62, 51 P.3d 1112, 1117-18 (Ct. App. 2002) (officer did not violate the 
Minnesota v. Dickerson standard where he ascertained that the suspect had a baggie of 
marijuana in his pocket without manipulating the pocket). 
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of Arredondo's 
was in fact entirely consistent plain 
, p.15, Ls.1 (Officer Arredondo, after the knife, 
pocket using his open hand, without grabbing or manipulating anything, 
immediately identified a drawn-up syringe in the pocket).) Tyler's claim that a 
search is necessarily limited to the outermost layer of clothing, such that his exposed 
shirt pocket was beyond the scope of the search, is not supported by the cases he cites. 
In his Respondent's brief, Tyler also asserts that district court made a factual 
finding that Tyler limited his consent to a pat-down of the outermost layer of his clothing. 
(Respondent's brief, ppA, 9-10.) The district court made no such finding. Rather, the 
district court found, based on the evidence actually presented, that Tyler consented to 
the search, but limited that consent to the scope of a Terry pat-down. (Tr., p.51, LS.10-
17; p.53, Ls.9-11.) The district court went on to hold, as a matter of law, that Terry 
searches were categorically limited to a pat-down of the outermost layer of clothing. 
(Tr., p.51, L.17 - p.53, L.9.) That holding is erroneous as a matter of law, and that is 
the basis on which the district court should be reversed. 
Tyler further asserts that his testimony the suppression hearing shows that he 
"intended to limit the scope of his consent to just the outer layer of his clothing." 
(Respondent's brief, p.9 (citing Tr., p.37, Ls.7-11).) Tyler actually testified, 
And we got into a slight argument about the Terry patdown, which was a 
search on the outside of the clothing only. And he says he knows what a 
Terry search is. And then he went immediately into my right, my right-
hand pocket. 
(T r., p. 37, Ls. 7 -11 .) did not testify that he understood a pat-down to 
limited the layer rather, he testified a Terry pat-down must 
5 
occur on the outside of the clothing. This is entirely consistent with the understanding 
he actually articulated during the stop: 
Officer Arredondo: I'm going to take that knife out of your pocket. Okay? 
And then I'll pat you down for more weapons. Okay? Is that okay? 
Tyler: It's okay to pat me down. A Terry search is fine, but I'm not going to 
give you permission to dig through my pockets. 
Officer Arredondo: Okay. That's fine. 
(State's Ex. 1; see also Tr., pA7, L.20 - pA8, LA.) Tyler made clear his understanding 
that a Terry search does not permit an officer to "dig through [a suspect's] pockets," 
which, as noted above, is entirely consistent with Terry. Officer Arredondo performed a 
limited search for weapons consistent with Terry and the scope of Tyler's consent, 
patting down Tyler's exposed shirt pockets, and not "digging through them." (See Tr., 
p.15, L.1 - p.16, L.3; p.27, L.23 - p.28, L.18.) Tyler's argument that he limited his 
consent to a pat-down of only his jacket and not his shirt is not supported by the record. 
The state does not challenge the district court's correct finding of fact that Tyler 
limited his consent to the scope of a Terry search. If Tyler wishes to challenge that 
finding by arguing that he further limited the search's scope to only his outermost layer 
of clothing, then he must establish clear error, which he has not. 
Completely contrary to the record on appeal, Tyler argues that Officer Arredondo 
manipulated Tyler's clothing in order to pat-down his right shirt pocket, which he asserts 
was covered by his jackets. (Respondent's brief, pp.13-14.) The only evidence 
presented at the hearing was that Officer Arredondo did not manipulate Tyler's clothing 
in any way in order to pat-down the exposed right breast pocket and feel the syringe. 
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9- , L.18; Ls.23-25.) Asked a 
was wearing a jacket, he testified, 
If got the jacket and open, I'd just - his hands are behind his 
I felt here, felt here, felt the syringe. There was no - I did not have to 
unzip anything. I didn't have to unbutton anything. I didn't have to pull his 
jacket off. I did nothing of the - of that to feel the pocket and feel 
syringe. 
, p.29, Ls.13-22.) In fact, Tyler acknowledged that Tyler moved the jacket, exposing 
flannel shirt with its pockets to the officer's view. (Tr., p.36, Ls.9-12.) Tyler's 
suggested finding that his pocket was covered by the layered jackets (and thus not 
exposed to Officer Arredondo's view) would be clearly erroneous. No one disputed that 
Officer Arredondo could see both shirt pockets on Tyler's flannel shirt; in fact, most of 
the examination of Officer Arredondo relied on the understanding that he could see the 
pockets. (See Tr., p.14, L.7 - p.15, L.17; p.25, L.24 - p.27, ) Unless we assume 
that Officer Arredondo has x-ray vision, the only possible conclusion is that Tyler's 
pocket was exposed to Officer Arredondo's view. 
Tyler also asserts that the district court made a factual finding that once Officer 
Arredondo "removed the weapon from Mr. Tyler's pocket, there was no longer 
reasonable suspicion" to allow him to continue the Terry search. (Respondent's brief, 
p.5.) The district court made no such factual finding. (See Tr., 50, L.4 - p.54, L.3.) 
Finally, citing the district court's sequence of events, Tyler asserts that "Officer 
Arredondo removed the knife from Mr. Tyler's pocket, and then asked Mr. Tyler whether 
he could conduct a pat down." (Respondent's brief, p.18 (emphasis original) (citing 
p.51, Ls.13-15).) The district court's sequence of events is clearly erroneous. (See 
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State's Ex. 1; see also ,p.46, L.24 - p.47, L.23.) The sequence of these particular 
events is however, because Tyler consented to the Terry search at issue. 
Tyler consented to a Terry search. Officer Arredondo did not exceed the scope 
of Tyler's consent when he, consistent with a Terry search, directly patted down the 
right pocket of Tyler's flannel shirt without manipulating his clothing. Considering the 
circumstances Officer Arredondo faced, such as Tyler's leaving a known drug house 
late in the evening and carrying a hidden instrument that could be used to assault the 
officer in his shirt's companion pocket, that limited pat-down was reasonable. The 
district court erred by applying a mechanistic rule foreign to the principles outlined by 
the United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, when it held that only pat-downs of 
the outermost layer of clothing were permissible under the Terry search exception. The 
district court's order suppressing the evidence should therefore be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order 
granting Tyler's suppression motion, and remand this case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 30th day of April, 2012. 
Deputy Attorney General 
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PU DEFENDER 
to placed The State Public Defender's basket located in the 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
Deputy Attorney General 
RJS/pm 
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